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Consequentialism with Wrongness
Depending on the Diculty of Doing Better
Johan E. Gustafsson∗
Moral wrongness comes in degrees. On a consequentialist view of ethics, the wrong-
ness of an act should depend, I argue, in part on how much worse the act’s conse-
quences are compared to those of its alternatives and in part on how dicult it is to
perform the alternatives with better consequences. I extend act consequentialism to
take this into account, and I defend three conditions on consequentialist theories.
The rst is consequentialist dominance, which says that, if an act has better conse-
quences than some alternative act, then it is not more wrong than the alternative
act. The second is consequentialist supervenience, which says that, if two acts have
equally good consequences in a situation, then they have the same deontic status in
the situation. And the third is consequentialist continuity, which says that, for every
act and for any dierence in wrongness δ greater than zero, there is an arbitrarily
small improvement of the consequences of the act which would, other things being
equal, not change the wrongness of that act or any alternative by more than δ. I
defend a proposal that satises these conditions.
Traditional consequentialism states that an act is right if and only if its conse-
quences are at least as good as those of every alternative act and, if the act is not
right, it is wrong. The wrong acts, however, might dier in ways that could be
morally relevant. The consequences of one of them might be almost optimal
while those of another are catastrophic in comparison. In addition to value dif-
ference, a further intuitively morally relevant dierence between dierent wrong
acts is how hard it would have been to avoid them—how hard it would have
∗ I would be grateful for any comments on this paper, which can be sent to me at
johan.eric.gustafsson@gmail.com.
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been to perform a better act instead.1 In this study, I shall defend an extended
version of consequentialism that is capable of taking these kinds of dierences
into account for a more ne grained grading of the wrongness of acts.
It is natural to assume that consequentialism can account for degrees of
wrongness by taking into account how much worse the consequences of a wrong
act are than those [p. 109] of the right acts.2 Consider a choice situation where
there are three available alternatives with consequences valued as follows:
Situation 1
Act Value
a1 100
a2 99
a3 0
Here, it appears reasonable to say that a3 is more wrong than a2, because the
loss of value compared to the optimal alternative, a1, is greater for a3 than for a2.
Moreover, it seems that, a3 is not just more wrong than a2, it is muchmore wrong
than a2 because the loss of value relative to a1 is much greater for a3 than for a2.3
1 If we grant the possibility of being passive and not performing any act in a choice situation,
there might be a dierence between how hard it is to avoid an act and how hard it is to perform
an alternative act. For the purposes of this study, however, I shall count being passive in a choice
situation as an act.
2 See, for example, Mackie (1977, p. 205), Eriksson (1997, pp. 218–219), and Calder (2005,
p. 229). Mill’s (1969, p. 210) proportionality criterion of wrongness, which says that acts are wrong
‘as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness’, might be read as suggesting a similar view.
3 The main theoretical interest in such cardinal information about how much more wrong an
act is compared to another act (rather than merely ordinal information about whether it is more
wrong than the other act) is that it aords a neat solution for dealing with the following kind of
case—rst discussed by Regan (1980, p. 265)—where two states of nature are equally likely:
Act State 1 (0.5) State 2 (0.5)
a1 Very minor wrong Very minor wrong
a2 Major wrong Right
a3 Right Major wrong
In this case, it seems that a morally conscientious person would choose a1, which is known to be
slightly wrong, rather than one of a2 and a3, each of which might be right but they both have a
0.5 chance of being very wrong. However, if a1 were instead known to be almost as wrong as a2
and a3 are in states 1 and 2 respectively, it appears that a morally conscientious person would
instead choose one of a2 and a3. Hence it appears that morally conscientious people are not just
concerned with avoiding wrong acts; their concern with avoiding wrong acts is proportional
to the acts’ degrees of wrongness; see Graham (2010, p. 99) and Bykvist (2011, p. 37). A natural
way of spelling this out is that morally conscientious people act as to minimize expected moral
wrongness, and that requires cardinal rather than merely ordinal degrees of wrongness.
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We introduce the following notation:
W(x) is the degree of wrongness of x.
V(x) is the value of the consequences of x.
Ω is the set of available alternatives.
Given that each alternative might be performed without diculty, the following
appears plausible:4
(1) W(x) =max{V(y) −V(x) ∣ y ∈ Ω}.
In other words, one calculates the degree of wrongness of an alternative x by,
for each alternative y, calculating the result of subtracting V(x) from V(y).
According to equation (1), the greatest of these results is equal to the degree
of wrongness of x. Given that all acts in situation 1 can be performed without
diculty, this yields thatW(a3) = 100 andW(a2) = 1. These results are, I think,
in line with what one would expect from a consequentialist theory capable of han-
dling degrees of wrongness. Another welcome feature is that the acts with optimal
consequences—that is, the right acts according to traditional consequentialism—
always get a zero degree of wrongness: In situation 1, for instance, equation (1)
yields thatW(a1) = 0.
In addition to value dierence, the wrongness of an act might depend on
the diculty of the acts with better consequences.5 In the literature, there are
various accounts of degrees of easiness and diculty of acts.6 I shall try to remain
neutral between these accounts. I shall assume, however, that each act among
your alternatives is securable in the sense that you cannot fail to perform the act
you have chosen to perform. Hence the easiness of an act should not be thought
4 Note that this is not the only formula that could account for the intuitions we have appealed
to so far. Taking an act’s degree of wrongness to be proportional to the value dierence between
the act’s consequences and those of the right act (or acts) appears, however, to be the simplest,
most straightforward way to do so. The aim of this paper is mainly to nd one plausible account
of degrees of wrongness depending on the diculty of doing something better and not to show
that it is the only plausible account of this kind.
5 Compare Part (1984, p. 33), who suggest that if it is very hard to not act in a certain way,
acting that way is only morally bad in a very weak sense. Moreover, compare Berlin (1958, p. 15n)
who suggests that the morally relevant sense of freedom depends not just on which possibilities
are open to the agent but also on how easy or hard they are to achieve.
6 For an early account of degrees of ability, see Benson (1987, p. 329). Moreover, see Portmore
(2007, p. 10) for a distinction between degree of diculty and degree of eort, and Cohen (1978,
pp. 238–239) for a distinction between diculty and cost.
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of as the probability of successfully performing the act given that you have chosen
to perform it. Non-securable acts—such as, buying a winning lottery ticket—are
better modelled as securable acts with an uncertain outcome—such as, buying a
lottery ticket when one does not know whether the ticket is a winner. A heroic
act such as throwing yourself on landmine to save your fellow soldiersmight very
well be easy in the sense that you are likely to succeed in performing it if you
choose to perform it. But this act is plausibly very dicult in the sense that it is
very dicult to bring yourself to choose to perform it, due, among other things,
to the sacrice the act involves. It is easiness and diculty of acts in this latter
sense that I wish to discuss [p. 110] in this study. That is, the relevant easiness of
an act is the easiness by which one can bring oneself to choose to perform the
act.
We will express the degree of easiness of an alternative on a scale from 0,
representing impossible, to 1, representing maximally easy, that is, performable
without any diculty.7 Consider the following situations:8
Situation 2 Situation 3
Act Value Easiness Act Value Easiness
a1 100 0.1 a1 100 0.9
a2 10 0.5 a2 10 0.5
The idea is that, even though the value dierence is the same in situation 2 as in
situation 3, act a2 is more wrong in situation 3 than in situation 2, because the
better alternative is easier in situation 3 than in situation 2. We introduce the
following notation for easiness:
E(x) is the degree of easiness of x.
The rst to develop an extension of consequentialism that takes degrees of
easiness into account was, as far as I know, Björn Eriksson.9He proposes that
7What I call degrees of easiness, Eriksson (1997, p. 219) calls degrees of diculty. That is,
degree of diculty 0 represents impossible and degree of diculty 1 represents something that
can be done without diculty. But this seems backwards. If, for example, a certain math exercise
has a higher degree of diculty than another, it should be more, not less, dicult. Portmore
(2007, p. 6) similarly takes a goal of zero diculty to be a goal that can be achieved without
diculty. Another dierence is that Eriksson (1997, p. 219) identies the least dicult degree
with something that cannot be avoided, while I allow that there may be two or more mutually
exclusive but maximally easy acts in a situation.
8 Eriksson (1997, p. 219).
9 Eriksson (1994, 1997).
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(2) W(x) =max{(V(y) −V(x)) E(y)
E(x) ∣ y ∈ Ω}.
This means that you calculate the degree of wrongness of an alternative x by,
for each alternative y, rst subtracting V(x) from V(y) and then multiplying
the result by E(y) divided by E(x). According to equation (2), the greatest of
these products is equal to the degree of wrongness of x. The theory yields that
W(a2) = 18 in situation 2 andW(a2) = 162 in situation 3. Consequently, we get
the desired result that a2 is more wrong in situation 3 than in situation 2.10
This line of thought brings us to a further reason for taking degrees of easiness
into account. The diculty of acts is relevant for moral rightness on all plausible
moral theories. The acts that are morally relevant are just those that are not so
hard that they are impossible to perform. So to let moral rightness and wrongness
depend on degrees of easiness is to take into account in a more ne grained way
something that all plausiblemoral theories take into account.Oneway of thinking
about this could be that the morally relevant property of being an alternative
comes in degrees or that an act’s relevance as an alternative comes in degrees
depending on how easy it is to perform.
Folke Tersman oers the following counter-example to equation (2):11
Situation 4
Act Value Easiness
a1 101 0.1
a2 100 0.001
a3 0 0.899
[p. 111] In this situation, equation (2) yields thatW(a2) = 100 andW(a3) ≈ 11.2.
It is implausible that a2 would be almost nine times as wrong as a3. The con-
sequences of a2 are almost as good as those for the right act, a1, while the con-
sequences of a3 are much worse. That a2 is much harder than a1 while a3 is
relatively easy should not make a2 more wrong than a3. Situation 4 shows that
(2) violates the following principle:
10 The division in equation (2) might raise worries about division by zero if alternatives might
have the degree of easiness 0. Yet it seems plausible that, if an act is an alternative, it can be
performed. Not just ought, but also the property of being an alternative, implies can. This entails
that all alternatives must have a degree of easiness greater than 0. Hence we avoid division by
zero.
11 Tersman (1997, p. 50).
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The principle of consequentialist dominance
If acts x and y are available in the same situation and x has better conse-
quences than y, then x is not more wrong than y.
If an act has better consequences than another act, it comes closer to what is,
according to consequentialism, the ultimate aim of morality at large: that con-
sequences be as good as possible.12 Hence the act with better consequences
should not be judged morally more severely. Should one give up the princi-
ple of consequentialist dominance, there would not be much le of traditional
consequentialism.
Situation 4 illustrates why it is unreasonable to let an act’s degree of wrongness
depend on its own degree of easiness. We nd a perhaps even clearer illustration
of this problem in the following situation, where two wrong alternatives have
equally good consequences but vary in terms of diculty:
Situation 5
Act Value Easiness
a1 100 0.5
a2 10 0.9
a3 10 0.1
Here, (2) yields thatW(a2) = 50 andW(a3) = 450. Whether you perform the
easier a2 or the harder a3 appears irrelevant for the degree of wrongness of what
you do.What matters is that, irrespective of whether you performed a2 or a3, you
have achieved an outcome worth 10 units of value while you could have achieved
an outcome worth 90 units more with degree of easiness 0.5. That is, a2 should
have the same degree of wrongness as a3.
Since (2) yields that a2 and a3 dier in degree of wrongness even though
they have equally good consequences, it violates the following principle, which
Krister Bykvist has dubbed as part of the ‘spirit of consequentialism’:
The principle of consequentialist supervenience
If two acts that are available in the same situation have equally good con-
sequences, then the acts have the same deontic status.13
12 See, for example, Bentham (1970, p. 282) and Part (1984, p. 24).
13 Bykvist (2002, p. 52).
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If one rejects the principle of consequentialist supervenience, one rejects a fairly
basic tenet of consequentialism. This, by itself, might not be so worrisome, but
as long as our ambition is to achieve a moderately conservative extension of
consequentialism, we should avoid this.14
One might still be unconvinced. Bykvist, for example, does not claim that
the principle of consequentialist supervenience holds if the deontic statuses of
acts depend in part [p. 112] on how hard they are.15 But note that the principle
of consequentialist supervenience cannot be denied if one accepts the principle
of consequentialist dominance along with the following principle, which any
plausible consequentialism with degrees of wrongness should satisfy:
The principle of consequentialist continuity
If act x is available in a situation, then, for any dierence in wrongness δ
greater than zero, there is an arbitrarily small improvement of the conse-
quences of x which would, other things being equal, neither increase nor
decrease the degree of wrongness of any available act in the situation by
more than δ.
This principle is plausible given consequentialism and graded moral assessment.
If moral assessment comes in degrees, gradual changes in the morally relevant
factors should yield gradual changes in the moral assessment. Moreover, the
principle of consequentialist continuity is satised by (2). Hence this principle
should, at least in this context, be fairly uncontroversial.
For the argument, assume the principle of consequentialist continuity and
the principle of consequentialist dominance. If the principle of consequentialist
supervenience is violated, there is a situation where two acts have equally good
consequences but the acts are not equally wrong. Consider the act that is more
14 Eriksson has told me that he gladly gives up the principle of consequentialist supervenience
since a suboptimal act which involves that one goes to extra trouble to act wrongly—that is, a wrong
act that is more dicult than it would be to act rightly—is more wrong than an axiologically
equivalent act that is easier than acting rightly. Still, the basis of this view is hard to discern. It
seems like Eriksson relies on the wrong kind of intuitions, that is, non-consequentialist intuitions.
Perhaps the idea is that dicult performances or that one goes to extra trouble is something that
is morally problematic in addition to any eect on the value of the consequences. Or it might be
that there is something especially tragic with a person who goes to extra trouble for something
that in the end still leads to a bad result. Furthermore, it might be evil to go to extra trouble in
order to, or with an aim to, do wrong. The problem is that none of this seems to have any basis
in consequentialism.
15 Bykvist (2003, p. 34n).
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wrong than the other act. Given the principle of consequentialist dominance, any
improvement of the consequences of this act would, other things being equal,
make it less wrong than the other act. Hence any improvement of this act would,
other things being equal, change the degree of wrongness of an act by at least
half of the previous dierence in wrongness between the two acts. This, however,
violates the principle of consequentialist continuity. So, if we accept the principle
of consequentialist continuity and the principle of consequentialist dominance,
we should also accept the principle of consequentialist supervenience.
Whether you perform an easy act or a hard act with equally good conse-
quences should be irrelevant given consequentialism. This does not, however,
rule out that theremight still be room for degrees of easiness even in amoderately
conservative extension of consequentialism that retains our three consequen-
tialist principles. According to consequentialism, the deontic status of an act
depends not only on the value of its consequences. The value of other acts’ con-
sequences are also relevant given that they are not impossible to perform in
the situation, that is, they have a degree of easiness greater than zero. Hence
the relevance or weight of the value of the consequences of other acts depends
to some extent on the degrees of easiness of these acts. This opens up for an
extension of consequentialism which in a more ne grained way takes degrees of
easiness into account without introducing anything too alien, that is, something
that is not to some extent already there in the traditional version.
Traditional consequentialism yields that an alternative is wrong if and only if
there is an act with better consequences which is not impossible to perform. This
can be expressed as that an alternative x is wrong if and only if there is an act
y such that E(y)multiplied by the [p. 113] result of V(y) subtracted by V(x)
is greater than zero. A natural extension would be to let the extent to which an
alternative is wrong depend on how much such a product of value dierence
and the better alternative’s degree of easiness diers from zero. This suggests that
one removes the division by the act’s own degree of easiness from equation (2),
which yields the following revision:16
(3) W(x) =max{(V(y) −V(x))E(y) ∣ y ∈ Ω}.
In other words, you calculate the degree of wrongness of an alternative x by,
for each alternative y, rst subtracting V(x) from V(y) and then multiplying
16 Like before, the claim here is just that this formula accounts for the intuitions we have
appealed to so far and not that it is the only formula that does so.
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the result with y’s degree of easiness. According to equation (3), the degree of
wrongness of x is equal to the greatest of these products. This revised proposal
satises the principle of consequentialist dominance. In situation 4, for example,
it gives the more plausible result thatW(a2) = 0.1 andW(a3) = 10.1. The theory
also satises the principle of consequentialist supervenience. In situation 5, it
yields thatW(a2) = W(a3) = 45.
Nevertheless, another counter-example demands more thorough revisions.
Compare the following situations, where situation 7 is just like situation 6 except
for the addition of a3:17
Situation 6 Situation 7
Act Value Easiness Act Value Easiness
a1 1,000 0.5 a1 1,000 0.5
a2 0 0.5 a2 0 0.5
a3 500 0.99
Each one of equations (2) and (3) yields that a2 is equally wrong in situation 6 as
in situation 7. Intuitively, a2 seems more wrong in situation 7 than in situation 6.
In situation 7, there is in addition to the right alternative, a1, a further alternative,
a3, that has much better consequences than a2 and which is also easier than a1.
Even though it is equally hard to do the right act in situation 6 as in situation 7,
a2 seems even more wrong in situation 7, because in that situation one could so
easily have done something with better consequences than a2.
In order to account for this, we need some slightly more complicated mathe-
matics. My proposal can, however, be explained without mathematical notation.
It has, as we shall see, a simple graphical interpretation. I propose that
(4) W(x) = ∫
max{V(u)∣u∈Ω}
V(x)
max{E(y) ∣V(y) ≥ z ∧ y ∈ Ω}dz.
To get an intuitive feel for the integral in equation (4) and also see how it handles
situations 6 and 7, it will help to consider the following kind of graph. On the
horizontal axis, we have increasingly greater values starting from the value of the
consequences of the act whose wrongness is measured—in the graph below, a2.
And, on the vertical axis, we have the maximum degree of easiness with which
one can perform an act whose consequences [p. 114] have a value at least as great
17 Tersman (1997, p. 52).
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as that on the horizontal axis in the situation—in the graph below, situation 6
(dashed) and situation 7 (solid).
Value
V(a2) V(a2) + 500 V(a2) + 1,000
Easiness
0.99
0.5
0
Situation 7
Situation 6
Given this kind of graph, my proposal can be simply stated as that the wrongness
of an act is equal to the area under the curve. Hence my proposal yields that a2
is more wrong in situation 7 than in situation 6. And with the above graph, it
is easy to see why. For all z such that z > 500, it is equally hard in situation 6
as in situation 7 to perform an act whose consequences have a value at least z
units higher than the value of those of a2. But, for all z such that 0 > z ≥ 500, it
is easier in situation 7 than in situation 6 to perform an act whose consequences
have a value that is at least z units higher than the value of those of a2. In each of
situations 6 and 7, one has an obligation to perform an act whose consequences
have a value of at least 1,000, and this obligation is equally hard to full in either
situation. But, in these situations, one also has an obligation to perform an act
whose consequences have a value of at least 500, and this obligation is easier to
full in situation 7 than in situation 6. It is the violation of this latter obligation
that makes a2 more wrong in situation 7 than in situation 6.
To calculate the degree of wrongness of an alternative x according to equa-
tion (4), check rst if there is an alternative with better consequences than x. If
there is no alternative with better consequences, x’s degree of wrongness is 0.
Otherwise, let y0 be an alternative with better consequences than x such that
there is no alternative easier than y0 with better consequences than x. Thenmake
a note of the product of E(y0) and the dierence betweenV(y0) andV(x). Then
starting with n = 0, you (*) check if there is an alternative with better conse-
quences than yn. If there is no alternative with better consequences than yn, then
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x’s degree of wrongness is equal to the last noted amount. Otherwise, let yn+1 be
an alternative with better consequences than yn such that there is no alternative
easier than yn+1 with better consequences than yn. Then calculate the product
of E(yn+1) and the dierence between V(yn+1) and V(yn). Make a note of the
sum of this product and the last noted amount. Increase n by one, and go back
to step (*).
Like equation (3), my proposal satises all three of our consequentialist
principles.18 And it yields the same results as (3) in situations 1–5. It does in
fact yield the same results as (3) in all situations where there are just two acts.
And, as with (3), it is easily seen that the addition of a dominated act—that is,
dominated in the sense that an already available act is at least as easy with at least
as good consequences—does not change the wrongness of the already available
acts. But, unlike (3), my proposal yields conversely [p. 115] that the addition
of a non-dominated act will always make acts with worse consequences more
wrong—which is exemplied by situations 6 and 7.
One might object that there is no moral excuse for doing a2 in either of
situations 6 and 7 because one could have done something with better conse-
quences with no more diculty. But, while it might appear intuitive that there is
18 To see that (4) satises the principle of consequentialist supervenience, note that the integral
in (4) is the same for the wrongness of all acts in the same situation except for the lower bound
of the domain of integration, which is equal to the value of the act’s consequences. Hence acts
with equally good consequences in the same situation are equally wrong.
To see that (4) satises the principle of consequentialist dominance, note that, if one act has
better consequences than another act in the same situation, the domain of integration in (4)
for the wrongness of the act with the better consequences is a proper subset of the one for the
wrongness of the other act. And note also that the integral in (4) is an integral of a non-negative
function, since degrees of easiness are non-negative. It follows that the integral for the wrongness
of the act with the worse consequences must be at least as great as the one for the wrongness of
the other act. Hence the act with the better consequences is not more wrong than the other act.
Finally, to see that (4) satises the principle of consequentialist continuity, note that the
integral in (4) only depends on the easiness and the value of the consequences of acts with better
consequences than x. Hence an improvement of the consequences of x will only change the lower
bound of the domain of integration of the integral for the wrongness of x. Since the integrated
function is bounded, a suciently small improvement of the consequences of x will thus result in
an arbitrarily small change in the wrongness of x, and a smaller improvement cannot result in a
greater change in the wrongness of x. And note also that, given (4), improving the consequences
of an act can increase the wrongness of another act in the same situation by at most the product
of the size of the improvement and the improved act’s degree of easiness. It follows that, for any
dierence in wrongness δ greater than zero, there is an arbitrarily small improvement of the
consequences of x which would not change the wrongness of any act in the situation by more
than δ.
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especially little moral excuse for doing a2 as it is no more dicult than doing a1,
we cannot plausibly take the relative easiness of acts into account when we assess
their wrongness. To see this, consider again situation 5. In this situation, it might
appear that what makes a3 especially wrong is that one could instead do a1 with
no more diculty. And, if that is what makes a3 especially wrong, it appears
that a3 should be more wrong than a2, since a2 has equally bad consequences as
a3 but is at least easier than a1. Yet a3 cannot be more wrong than a2 according
to the principle of consequentialist supervenience. And that principle is, as I
have argued, supported by the principles of consequentialist dominance and
consequentialist continuity, both of which are hard to deny.
I wish to thank Gustaf Arrhenius, Richard Yetter Chappell, Björn Eriksson, Daniel
Ramöller, Nicolas Espinoza, Marc Fleurbaey, Christopher Jay, Jesper Jerkert, Martin
Peterson, Christian Piller, Mozaar Qizilbash, Tor Sandqvist, Folke Tersman, Fredrik
Viklund, an anonymous referee, and the audiences at the Philosophy Research seminar,
Royal Institute of Technology, 27 August 2013, and at the Practical-Philosophy-Group
Seminar, University of York, 28 October 2015.
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